

SEC. I., CHAP. 5.

in some sort, experiences cognition, will, and so on. ¹ From this conclusion, they speculate as follows. Cognition, &c., they call affections of the internal organ, are reflected in the soul, and these reflexions* of cognition and so forth are supposed to be experiences of cognition, &c.: a distinction being taken between the two classes. In this way the soul becomes an experiencer of cognition, will, happiness, and misery. The experience of cognition being itself a cognition, the soul may be said to cognize. But the experiences of will, happiness, and misery cannot, suitably with the Sāṅkhya system, be denominated will, happiness, and misery. Hence, it is not allowed, that the soul wills, and is happy and miserable, but only that it is the experiencer of will, happiness, and misery; though, occasionally, the reflexions of happiness and misery are found spoken of as happiness and misery, instead of experiences, of them. Those experiences are, however, pronounced to be unreal; for an experience of this sort, while the reflexion of an affection of the internal organ, is likewise an evolution from that organ, precisely as its affections are, and extrinsic to the soul. When it is termed unreal, it is not meant, that it has no real existence, but that it does not inhere in the soul, and that it is incapable of producing any change in its essence. It is like the reflexion, in crystal, of a red rose: where, only from misapprehension, would it be thought, that the colour reflected belongs to the crystal. Now, in our view, the soul cannot be an experiencer in consequence of the reflexions spoken of. For, when a man has an experience, a change really takes place in his soul. This would be the case, the Sāṅkhyas admit, if cognition, will, happiness, and misery could be regarded as qualities of the soul; as they are regarded by the Naiyāyikas, whose dogma on this point, as making the soul changeable, the Sāṅkhyas arraign as unsound. On the Sāṅkhya ground, then, that the reflexions in question work no change in the soul, and are alien to it, the soul cannot, by reason of them, become an experiencer. Nevertheless, the Sāṅkhyas, strange to tell, for all that they say these reflexions are extrinsic to the soul, declare, that, owing to them, the soul becomes an experiencer of cognition, will, &c. In this there is a plain contradiction in terms; for it amounts to an assertion, coupled with a denial, that the soul has experience. The following remarks will enable us to understand how the Sāṅkhyas came to entangle themselves in such an incongruity.

Most imperfect and erroneous, generally, are the notions of the so-called Hindu philosophers about things metaphysical and physical. Whatever two things these schemers see to be in relation, they must straightway ascertain the species of that relation. For

* The European reader must be constantly on his guard against supposing, that by reflexions, the Sāṅkhyas mean, figuratively impressions made in the essence of the soul. What the Sāṅkhyas do mean will be seen from the present chapter, and from the second, with the notes attached to the latter.

SEC. I., CHAP. 5.

After laying down the proposition, that, wherever there is fire, there is smoke, the first step to be taken, towards completing the proposition, is, they say, to ascertain the relation that subsists between the smoke and the place of its appearance. So, likewise, the relation of the fire to the site it occupies must be ascertained. And it is only by these relations, that the smoke is a token, and the fire that which is betokened.* The two relations here instanced are of the same sort, known as *sanyoga*. Again, it is deemed necessary to determine the relation between a quality and that to which it belongs, and between a whole and its component elements, &c. &c. The evil that has sprung from thus theorizing is, that the pandits came to look upon relations, *sanyoga*, *samarāya*,† &c., as real objective entities, as having existence apart from the objects they connect, and were led to sunder things further than is reasonable to sunder them. Thus, according to the Naiyāyika, an instance may sometimes be so far independent of qualities as to want them altogether. The qualities of what they reckon as originated substances are not produced, they affirm, until after the production of those substances themselves. Take a jar, for example. During the first moment of its production, it is devoid, in their view, of all qualities whatsoever, as colour, smell, taste, and tangibility. In the second moment it becomes endowed with them. Again, the Naiyāyikas contend, that a whole is a different thing from the mere sum of its parts. By the joining together of the parts a new entity is generated in the whole which results:‡ as has been remarked, it has, for

* Such relations are called, respectively, *heturācchhedaka* and *sādhyācchhedaka*; or "the determinator of tokenness," and "the determinator of betokenedness."

† *Sanyoga*, one of the four and twenty qualities of the Nyāya, is contact, the mutual touching of two substances. Only, as mentioned in the text, it is an entity, and has existence irrespectively of the substances to which it belongs. Moreover, it is destroyed by *vibhāga* "separation"; which also is a quality. But, as a cause must exist prior to its effect, separation, before performing its destructive office, is fabled to coexist with contact for a single moment.

Samarāya, like *sanyoga*, is, in the first place, an entity. It is the relation between substance and quality, between a whole and its parts, &c. &c. It is eternal; so that, though the things which it stands between perish, itself remains. Numerically, it is one; and thus it is the same *samarāya* that connects a jar and its colour in India, and another jar and its colour in Europe; and that connected Adam's soul with its qualities, and that connects the reader's with its own. As the reason for maintaining its unity, the Naiyāyikas simply refer to the *lex parimonie*, and leave common sense altogether out of the question. It is useless to try to translate *samarāya*. Colebrooke substitutes "aggregation, or intimate and constant relation;" Dr. J. B. Ballantyne, "intimate union," "inherence," "coinherence," "coinhesion."

‡ It was a favourite pleasantry of a late most celebrated Naiyāyika pandit at Benares, that, in rigid accordance with his system, on receiving back from a goldsmith ornaments wrought from metal furnished to him, it would be quite just to demand double weight; that of the original gold, and, again, as much in ornaments.

For it is not held, that, on the production of a whole, the parts concurring to it are annihilated.

SEC. I., CHAP. 5.

a single moment, no qualities,* whereas its parts have resides in its parts by the relation styled *samarāya*. It is a whole is predicated as residing thus in its parts, that Naiyāyikas, in respect of the enunciation, that smoke betokens fire set about, first of all, to ascertain by what relation it does so. For, as smoke is said to reside in a place by the relation of *sanyoga*, so it is said to reside in its parts by the relation of *samarāya*. Therefore, by simply asserting, that, wherever there is smoke there is fire, one is apt to mislead; since smoke, besides residing in a given place, resides, by the relation of *samarāya*, in its own parts, where fire is not.

We have now learnt how the Naiyāyikas, by transmuting relations into entities, and interposing these entities between things correct, dis sever what in nature we find most closely allied. Accordingly, these philosophers, though they profess to believe cognition, &c. to be qualities of the soul, are seen—when we come to understand how they speak of qualities and substance—to make them extrinsic to it. When, therefore, cognition &c. are said, in their character of qualities to belong to the soul by the relation of *samarāya*, we recognize a position inadequate to that of their residing in the soul by inherence;† and yet the Nyāya, on the

It is because of their notion regarding the novelty of wholes, that the Naiyāyikas are designated as *asatkāryavādins*, in contradistinction from the Sāṅkhyas and Vedāntins, who are termed *satkāryavādins*; the former holding, that an effect has non-existent before its production. and the latter, that an effect has existence, in its material cause, antecedently to its manifestation, or eduction, *abhivṛtti*. Hence, the Sāṅkhyas do not hold, that a property and its substrato, *dharma* and *dharmin*, are altogether alien to each other. In one sense, it is true, they are taken as different; but, in another sense, they are reputed one. The reader will have observed, repeatedly, in foregoing notes, the expression *dharma-dharmy-abhedāt*, "because of the non-difference of a property and that which is propertied."

In this case, the Sāṅkhyas and the Vedāntins approve themselves nearer to rationality than the Naiyāyikas: but the case is rare of its kind.

* The reason assigned is this. Every effect must have three causes, the *samarāya*, *asamarāya*, and *nimitta*. A jar, when produced, is considered to be a new entity; and the same view is taken of its qualities. Of the jar, its parts are the *samarāya* cause; the contact of those parts, its *asamarāya*; and the potter and his implements, its *nimitta*. Of the qualities of the jar, itself is the *samarāya*; and the qualities of the parts of the jar, are the *asamarāya* of those qualities. Their *nimitta* is as before. As every cause must precede its effect, the jar, a cause of its own qualities, must exist previously to the production of its qualities.

A very recent authority, of most respectable weight, speaks thus of the three Naiyāyika causes: "It is commonly understood, that the Nyāya philosophy acknowledges three sorts of causes, substantial or inherent, non-substantial or exterior, and a third which might, perhaps, be conveniently styled the operative cause." Professor Banerjen's *Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy*, p. 127.

† Let it not be supposed, that, because the Naiyāyikas repute substance the *samarāya* cause of its qualities,—as was said in the last note,—they look upon qualities as being intrinsic to substance. For, in the twenty-four qualities, they include differentness, contact, separation, remoteness, &c., as real entities. Of these also the substance in which they reside is the *samarāya* cause; and they cannot, with any propriety, be said to be intrinsic to such substance.

SEC. I., CHAP. 5.

Immediately under discussion, is much nearer to the truth than the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta.

And now we are prepared for easy apprehension of a transition to a much graver error. If the soul, ask the Sāṅkhyas, may become a cognizer &c., from possessing cognition &c. by the relation of *samavāya*, why may it not become so from possessing cognition and so forth by any other relation? That the soul becomes thus possessed by the relation of *samavāya*, they refuse to admit; since the admission would imply a change in the soul's nature. Still, studious to make out the soul a cognizer &c., or else an experiencer of cognition &c., they proceed in this wise. The reflexions of cognition, will, happiness, misery, &c. are experiences of them, severally. These reflexions, or experiences, rest upon the soul. To the Sāṅkhyas an alternative is ~~here~~^{now}, they think, presented. They allow themselves to suppose, that the soul cognizes, wills, &c., in the affections of the internal organ, cognition, will, &c., which are connected with the soul by the relation of reflexion; or to suppose, if they choose, that the soul is an experiencer of cognition &c., in those reflexions, the experiences of cognition &c., which rest on the soul by the relation of *sanyoga*. In order to the soul's cognizing &c., what does it matter, ~~the~~^{the} Sāṅkhya asks of the Naiyāyika, if cognition and the rest do not reside in the soul by the relation of *samavāya*; seeing that the soul has them by some other relation; and there being no ground for restriction to the relation of *samavāya*. The Naiyayika, thus controverted by the Sāṅkhya, cannot, in my opinion, return, with his imperfect views, any answer founded in reason.

Precisely the error of the Sāṅkhyas which has just been detailed is that of a distinguished Pandit of Beuares, to whom I applied for solution of divers of my doubts. One of my questions was as follows: Since, if the Sāṅkhyas believe that misery resides in the soul as a reflexion only, which reflexion is held to be an evolution from the internal organ, the soul cannot really be miserable, why all the toil of the Sāṅkhya system to liberate the soul? The reply was, in part, as follows: * "And, if thou

Obviously enough it was the old, and all but universally diffused, ex-nihiliā maxim, which suggested to the Naiyāyikas, that every effect must have a *samavāyi* cause; a cause which, by legitimate deduction from that maxim, ought to mean one from which an effect is evolved, or developed. From this notion the Naiyāyikas have, however, strayed afar; and what they intend by their *samavāyi* cause is equally unintelligible and unaccountable. This is evident from their contending, that an effect is altogether a new entity, as compared with its *samavāyi* cause; and from this, that they maintain substance to be such a cause of its own qualities; these being extraneous to it, and of a different category.

* First, he detected an inaccuracy in the expression "if the Sāṅkhyas believe, that misery resides in the soul as a reflexion only;" for, in strict Sāṅkhya phraseology the reflexion of misery is not misery, but is its experience. Ever and anon, however, the Sāṅkhyas express themselves as the author expressed himself. See the first passage from the *Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya*, given at the foot of p. 44.

SEC. I., CHAP. 5.

intendest to imply, that, according to the *Sāṅkhya*, the soul be miserable through the unreal relation of reflexion, * * * shouldst be asked, in return, 'Though thou holdest, as in the *Nyāya*, that the suffering of misery, which is an experience, is a quality; still, how, either by that quality, or by *samavāya*, can the soul be miserable?' * * In passing, the Pandit assumes, inadvertently that I here go the whole way with the *Naiyāyikas*. I take his purport to be this. If, with a view to prove the soul miserable, a relation between it and misery, an affection of the internal organ, is demanded, the relation of reflexion is available; and, should it be objected, that the soul cannot become miserable by such a relation, it may be enquired, how it can become so even by the relation of *samavāya*. Then he goes on as follows: "And what superiority, save ~~this~~ *ag* conversancy with it, dost thou see in the *Naiyāyika* system, that it alone pleases thee? And what inferiority, waiving that, it is novel to thee, dost thou see in the *Sāṅkhya* system, that thou findest the acceptance of it difficult?" †

Another question proposed by me was this: If misery belongs to the internal organ, how can its removal profit the soul? The Pandit replies: "The fact, that misery resides in another *than the soul* does not prevent its cessation from being a good to the soul. For misery, which is held, by those who abhor the relation of reflexion, to reside in the soul by *samavāya*, resides, by some other relation, in what is not soul." ‡ In the *Nyāya*, cognition and other qualities, though residing in the soul by the relation of *samavāya*, are spoken of as residing in time by temporal relation, in space, by spatial relation, &c. &c. What the learned Pandit means is, then, this. If it be argued, that, because the *Sāṅkhyas* believe misery to reside in another than the soul, that is to say, in the internal organ, its removal cannot benefit the soul, neither can

* यदि च प्रतिबिम्बरूपावास्तवसंबन्धेनाऽऽत्मनो दुःखित्वं न सम्भवतीति तवाऽऽशयस्तर्हि * * * भवानेवं प्रतिप्रष्टव्यः । स दुःखमोगः साक्षात्काररूपः साक्षात्कारश्च गुणविशेष इति तेन वा समवायेन वाऽऽत्मा कथं दुःखी स्यात् ।

† कं च विशेषं नैयायिकमते पूर्वपरिचयव्यतिरिक्तं पश्यसि येन तदेव भवते रोचते कं चाऽभिनवत्वादन्यमपकर्षं साङ्ख्यमते पश्यसि येन तस्य ग्रहण आयुष्मान् क्लिश्यति ।

‡ दुःखनिवृत्तेः पुरुषार्थत्वे हि दुःखस्याऽन्यगतत्वं न बाधकं प्रतिबिम्बसम्बन्धविद्वेषिभिः समवायेनाऽऽत्मनि स्वीकृतस्याऽपि दुःखस्य केनचित् सम्बन्धेनाऽऽत्मानि सत्वात् ।

SEC. I., CHAP. 5.

benefit the soul even according to the Naiyáyikas; such as, in their view, misery resides, by various relations, other things besides the soul. As we are aware, agreeably to the Sánkhyas, misery &c. are qualities of the internal organ. If they are so, what has their continuance, or their elimination, to do with the soul? But of this weighty objection the Pandit makes small account. The reason is; that, to his mind, *samaváya*, here a relation of the first importance, is quite on a parity with what are here inferior relations, such as the temporal and the spatial. This will serve as a sample of the degree to which the common sense of the pandits has become distempered. And I shall now address myself to show what that relation is between the experience of cognition, will, happiness, misery, &c., and that which is in truth the experiencer of them.

First, however, I must bestow a few words on the great error, committed by the Sánkhyas, of distinguishing between happiness and the like, and their experiences. Who is conscious of any such distinction? From experience of happiness deduct experience: can one then form any idea what happiness is by itself? Not at all. Consequently, all the qualities of the soul, to-wit, cognition, will, activity, happiness, and so on, ought to be regarded as so many different sorts of experience; as was previously exemplified, in the case of will. Or, should there be some very nice distinction between happiness, or the like, and the experience of it, the two, at all events, are inseparable. It follows, that there is no foundation for the theory of separating cognition &c. from their experiences, on which the doctrine depends, that the internal organ is the subject of happiness and so forth, and that the soul is their experiencer.

And now I purpose to make out, that the soul cannot, by any chimerical reflexions of cognition, will, &c., erroneously regarded as experiences of cognition and the rest, become an experiencer thereof. It is self-evident, that the experiences of cognition, will, happiness, misery, &c. are qualities of their experiencer: for a quality is that which cannot exist abstracted from its substrate. For example, the existence of colour, or of taste, or of length, or of breadth, under such abstraction, is impossible. And it is the same as concerns the experience of cognition, or the like, considered severally from its experience. Indeed, experience, thus circumstanced, is brought into the category of the son of a barren woman and the horn of a hare. From this it is clear, that the experiences of cognition, will, &c. are qualities; and, being such, they are connected with their substrates by the relation through which every other quality belongs to that which possesses it.

In the terminology of the Naiyáyikas, the relation between quality and substance is that of *samaváya*. But this *samaváya*, as

SEC. I., CHAP. 5.

they describe it, seems to me not only hypothetical, but irrational and so I decline to designate by it the relation between quality and substance. To this relation I assign no name whatever. When, in our argumentations, we have reached the boundary of the certain and of the intelligible, there is nothing left for us but to be silent. As for the relation of quality and substance, reason teaches us, that it is widely different from *sanyoga* and such other relations. It is a relation through which quality penetrates and permeates the very essence of substance, and participates in it. Just so does experience with reference to an experiencer.

A reflexion, though, in respect of space, it is very near the soul,—in fact, within it, like everything else; for, in the *Sāṅkhya*, the soul is all-pervading,—is far remote from its essence. In the *Sāṅkhya* scheme, it is an evolution from the internal organ, and must reside in the soul by the relation of *sanyoga*, and not otherwise. Now, how can the soul, by virtue of it, be an experiencer? For, if it has not experience in its proper essence, it has none at all. Analogically, let it be, that a sage sits ever so close to a fool, or embraces him, if you will: can the fool, in consequence, be pronounced wise?

The European physicists, who have explored acoustics, optics, and other similar departments of science, declare, that, when a man sees an object, the following process is transacted. First, the object is imprinted upon the retina, behind which is a sensory nerve connecting it with the brain. The nerve and the brain are, thus, successively affected. Then, owing to some relation between the brain and the soul, that is to say, between matter and what is not matter, the object seen is cognized. That relation is incomprehensible: and yet of so much we are certain; that neither does the objects being reflected into the eye, nor does the effect produced in the sensory nerve, through the reflexion, nor does the action upon the brain, through the sensory nerve, constitute the soul's cognition. For, though the relation between the brain and the soul is most intimate, still the brain is distinct from the soul, and extrinsic to it. The soul's cognizing consists in this, that itself, that is to say, by its essence, apprehends an object through the eye and the other media enumerated.

The conclusion is, that, if the *Sāṅkhya*'s reflexions of the affections cognition, will, activity, happiness, and misery are distinct from the soul's proper essence, they are not the soul's experiences of cognition, will, &c.; since, though, as to space, they are exceedingly proximate to the soul, yet, viewed essentially, they are as distant as the east from the west. Inasmuch, therefore, as the soul can neither cognize, nor will, nor energize, nor be happy or miserable, nor be an experiencer of cognition, &c. &c., why should the *Sāṅkhyas* strive so hard to liberate it? In another way, moreover, the *Sāṅkhyas* deceive themselves and others. They say,

SEC. I., CHAP. 5.

Happiness and the like are not really in the soul, but that, from non-discrimination, the soul thinks itself miserable and bound: this is its wretchedness, emancipation from which is desirable. In this statement there are two great errors. One is this. The non-discrimination spoken of is itself an affection of the internal organ. As such, it has no intrinsic relation to the soul; only that of a reflection: and how, then, can the soul be prejudiced by it? The other error is this. Even if the soul, from non-discrimination, did think itself miserable and bound,—which the Sāṅkhyas will not grant,—still, it could take no harm merely from thus thinking, so long as it did not, in reality, incur misery by reason of non-discrimination. If, then, the Sāṅkhyas conceded, that it thus incurs misery, it would be really miserable. And, if they deny—and they do deny—that it does, it follows, that it stands in no need of being emancipated.

Therefore, that position only, which is laid down in the sixty-second stanza of the *Sāṅkhyā-kārikā*, can be justified on Sāṅkhyā principles; namely, that it is not the soul, but nature, that is hampered and that is disengaged.

I have already shown, that the Sāṅkhyas go to all the trouble they take to prove the soul devoid of apprehension, desire, &c., in order that the soul may be proved susceptible of emancipation.* They allege, that, if apprehension, desire, happiness, misery, and the rest be acknowledged to be qualities of the soul, they must be a part of its proper nature: and the nature of anything is inalienable. Only by making out the soul to be unendowed with apprehension and the like, they say, does its emancipation become possible. For, in the view of all the pandits, there is no emancipation apart from insentience. That riddance from pain is indispensable, we all hold alike. Now, let it be granted, for a moment, that these notions are correct; that is to say, that emancipation cannot take place without the abolition of apprehension, and that misery, like cognition, &c., if a quality of the soul, must continue for ever. Still, it is improper, out of fear for the soul, to describe a thing as being other than it is, and to give aid to such a deceit by sophistry. I mean, that it is wrong to insist, that apprehension, desire, and so on, which are really qualities of the soul, are not so. Man, we know, is mortal. But, if, from dread of death, I, a man, affirm, that I am not a man, shall I, on that account, escape death? If, therefore, the Sāṅkhyas are convinced, that whatever has apprehension, desire, &c. for qualities is doomed to the fearful evil of never parting with them, it is the counsel of wisdom, seeing that they are left without resource, to abide their lot in patience, and not to belie reality.

* It cannot but seem extraordinary blindness, in the Sāṅkhyas, not to perceive, that the very efforts which they put forth to show, that the soul is capable of being emancipated, go to prove that it has no need of being emancipated.

SEC. I., CHAP. 6.

The truth is, however, that the pandits' notion is baseless. Emancipation consists in definitive alienation of apprehension. And the assertion of the Sāṅkhyas is erroneous, that, whatever the misery for a quality can never be discharged of it. When the cause of misery is removed, the misery likewise takes its departure; and Almighty God will deliver from it whomsoever He blesses with His grace. I shall treat of these points when I discuss the Nyāya.

CHAPTER 6.

Brief Consideration of one Topic of the Mīmāṃsā, with a few Remarks on the Intellectual Peculiarities of the Pandits, and on their Style of Reasoning.

Greatly do the Mīmāṃsakas err, in not acknowledging God; * and, again, while they do not acknowledge Him, in believing in virtue and vice, and in laying upon the heads of men the burthen of rites and ceremonies; and, lastly, in maintaining, that the Veda has existed from eternity. My refutation, in the third chapter of this section, of the first two of these errors, as held by the Sāṅkhyas, will equally well apply to the Mīmāṃsakas. But there is this difference of view between the two schools, as regards the Veda. The Sāṅkhyas hold, that, at the beginning of every renovation of the universe, it issues anew from the mouth of Brahmā, but without his composing it; whereas, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, it has always existed: and the same arguments that are good against the former notion are just as cogent when applied to the latter. However, as for this latter view, that is to say, that the Veda was made by no one, but of itself has been in existence from all duration, one may indeed wonder at such an irrational theory. If asked for their proofs of this, the Mīmāṃsakas can only reply, that no name of the writer of the Veda has come down to us.† But what sort of a proof is this? Many is the book whose author's name nobody knows: but do we infer, therefore, that such a book never

* To name one Mīmāṃsaka,—Pārthasārathi Miśra, in the first chapter of the *Sastrapīṭhā*, labours at length to overset the arguments adducible to prove the existence of deity.

† यदि वेदानां कर्ता कश्चिदभविष्यत् ततोऽवश्यमध्येतृपरम्परया बुद्धादिव-
दस्मरिष्यत् । Pārthasārathi Miśra, in the first chapter of the *Sastrapīṭhā*

“Had there been any author of the Veda, surely remembrance of him would have been preserved by successive students of the Veda; as has been the case in respect of Buddha and others.”

Pārthasārathi goes on to urge, that, if the Vedas had had an author, it is impossible he could ever have been forgotten.

SEC. I., CHAP. 6.

beginning in time? And how, pray, differs an ancient book from an ancient house? And who ever concluded, that an old house had been built from the beginning of all things, on the ground, that its builder's name has been lost in oblivion? There is, in short, only one topic connected with the Mīmāṃsā, on which I purpose to remark. It is as follows.

To find, that the Mīmāṃsā esteems the Veda to be infallibly authoritative, and, nevertheless, decides, that the gods named in it are all imaginary,* and that the relations concerning them there are mere fables; and to find, that, though Indra is denied to exist, yet to make offerings in his name is sufficient to ensure great reward; cannot but strike one with astonishment. Wherever, allege the Mīmāṃsakas, the gods and their exploits are spoken of in the Veda, it is not intended to recount actual facts: the end in view being to magnify the benefit of ritual acts, and so to allure men to engage in them. But how can any one who has the slightest discrimination say, after reading the Veda, that the persons who originally addressed its hymns to Indra and others, did not themselves believe these to be real divinities? And who can imagine a man's doing worship to an unreal god, and singing praises to a nonentity, and imploring nobody, in the expectation of receiving therefore eminent recompense?

On this subject Mīmāṃsakas seem to reason thus. All our strivings are for the attainment of reward; this reward being dependent upon works; and information about works being obtainable from the preceptive enunciations of the Veda. If we accept these three things, why need we accept more? If we hold the precepts of the Veda to be true, what harm is there in our looking upon the rest of the Veda as a romance? And, if reward comes of works, these suffice; and what is the use of the gods and the rest? Again, if works give rise to various fruits, then, as a seed possesses an innate power of originating a sprout, so, by maintaining, that works possess an innate energy, we are enabled to account for the production of the world; and what necessity, in that case, is there of a God? To refute such strange notions may be spared: the very statement of them is refutation. Still, I shall reply to them in the third chapter of the second section, where I speak of the error into which the pandits fall on the subject of virtue and vice.

Thus I have examined, in the present and three preceding chapters, the main doctrines of the Sāṅkhya—the Yoga included—and of the Mīmāṃsā. Any man whose common sense is unsophisticated, on inspecting these doctrines as set forth and defended in the Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā, must perceive, that the pandits are most faulty in their manner of argumentation. As compared with

* See the extract from the *Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā*, cited at p. 50.

SEC. I., CHAP. 6.

those systems, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika are greatly exposed. And yet their adherents also, ancient and modern, betray intellectual defects common to all the pandits; as will before long be evinced.

Even as concerns things that are self-evident, these scholars go deplorably amiss. When a person reaches this state, it is most difficult to bring truth home to him. If a man, for instance, gets to doubt whether he has twenty fingers and toes, who can resolve his misgiving for him? You count them, one by one, to him; but, nevertheless, he cannot satisfy himself that they make up a score. After this, there is no hope of removing his uncertainty. Something similar to this state of mind is that of the pandits; as one cannot but see, on looking into the Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā. To dispel their difficulties is, consequently, no easy task; and yet I have ventured to undertake it. But, such are the peculiarities of my countrymen,—as I know from old experience,—that they will not understand my answers; and the real reason is, that they do not wish to understand them. Where there are persons who cannot be reached by rational arguments, we can only commend them to God; for to Him is possible what to man is impossible.

In this, again, the pandits manifest their wrong habits of mind, that when they set about considering a subject, they do not, first of all, soberly ask themselves what the facts are, bearing on it, which they and others are acquainted with. Such is the spell over their minds, and, from prepossession towards what they wish to believe, such is the partiality of their contemplation, that they adopt maxims which are baseless, as if they had no imperfection, and accept defective illustrations in place of proofs, and reason on the strength of them: nor do they reflect whether their arguments are cogent or futile, or whether they may not be met by counter-arguments. And so they go on, rearing one thing upon another, utterly regardless of the preposterousness of their conclusions.

One more defect of their intellectual constitution is this, that they fail to enquire what things are within the range of human reason, and what are beyond it. With the short cord of human wit they vainly essay to measure the profundities of God's fathomless perfections, and to determine their limits. He who will act thus cannot but stumble and at last fall disastrously.

People who follow the dictates of common sense steer clear, for the most part, of such errors. Common sense is that sense which is shared by the generality of mankind. By its aid, even the illiterate and rustics are able, in their daily occasions and transactions, to judge between the true and the false, and between the useful and the harmful. When any one, abandoning it, sets about adducing grand arguments in support of his favourite notions, he is very apt to get lost in a wilderness of nonsense, and to think, that the ground is above his head and the sky beneath his feet. But,

SEC. I., CHAP. 6.

the admonitions of common sense is not the way of the
 ; and so we see how such wonderful dogmas as they
 profess came to be suggested to them.

Their style of reasoning may be illustrated by the following
 story. Once on a time, two men, travelling in company, laid a
 wager as to who would first reach the end of the next day's journey.
 One of them, getting up early the following morning, saw that the
 other was still asleep. With great complacency, he thereupon
 dressed, tied up his kit, and set off. In his haste, however,
 unawares to himself, he put on the other's turban instead of his
 own. Hurrying forward, on reaching the end of the day's journey,
 he found his companion had not got the start of him, and was not
 even within sight. And then he sat down, opened his bundle,
 took out his mirror, and began to inspect himself. Seeing that he
 had on the other's turban, he flung down the mirror, exclaiming :
 " Alas ! well-a-day ! I have taken all his trouble to get here first ;
 and, after all, my friend has outstripped me." On this, a bystander,
 who had heard his lament, began to reason with him. " What do
 you mean ?" said he. Here you are, arrived and waiting ; and how
 can you say, that your friend has, after all, outstripped you ? Can
 you be so bewildered as to believe, that your sense of self has been
 transferred to another ?" But still he turned a deaf ear. He had
 resolved on taking it for an invariable rule, that his friend's turban
 could be on no one's head but his friend's ; and, accordingly, he
 must infer, that he himself had become the other, and that he
 had all along been labouring under illusion, in thinking it was
 himself who had started first on the day's journey, and prosecuted
 it, and completed it.

SECTION II.

CHAPTER 1.

Briefly prefatory with an Examination of the Nyáya and Vais'eshika Doctrines touching God.

I shall now consider the Nyáya and the Vais'eshika. But, as I have before noted, there are many doctrines common to almost all the Systems. When I take up such points, in discussing the Nyáya and Vais'eshika, what I shall offer will, therefore, be applicable to the Systems generally.

At the outset I remarked, that the authors of nearly all the Systems announce, as the great end of their compositions, the attainment of final beatitude. At their respective beginnings, the Nyáya and the Vais'eshika Aphorisms make distinct statements to that effect. And so far forth they are worthy of commendation ; being most fitting to all men, and it being of all things most necessary, that they should strive, with their entire might, to find out the means of salvation. Yet I cannot concur with the partizans of the Systems, in regarding right apprehension as the chief cause of emancipation ; my own belief being, that this effect springs from the spontaneous grace of God. I acknowledge, indeed, that right apprehension is instrumental to salvation ; but it is not that right apprehension, consisting in discriminating between soul and what is not soul, which the authors of the Systems teach to be the sole means thereto. That sort of right apprehension, taken by itself, I hold to be of no benefit ; a position which I shall substantiate by and bye. The sort of right apprehension which I maintain to be beneficial is this : rightly to apprehend God, and oneself, and one's wretchedness, and the way of escape from it, and what man ought to do, and what he ought to forbear. I do not mean, however, that to acquire, in its entirety, a right apprehension of these things is absolutely necessary ; for this is impossible to man. I mean, that he ought to make this acquisition in so far as it is indispensable to his good. Requisite right apprehension, as concerns God, should be such as to move man to honour, to love, to worship, and to fear Him ; such as to purify man's nature, and to lead him to love virtue and to abhor vice. And, further, a man's right apprehension, pertaining to himself, should be so much as to enable him to appreciate his place in the order of the universe ; to think of himself as he appears in the sight of God ; and to understand his relation to God, and his relations to his fellow-creatures, in

SEC. II., CHAP. 1.

that he may be qualified to act according to those relations. And, again, a man's right apprehension should be sufficient to qualify him to realize his own wretchedness, so that he may take thought how to escape from it; and sufficient for him to acquaint himself with the means calculated to bring about such escape, so that he may avail himself of those means. But of these things there is no correct account in the Nyáya, or in the other Systems. Far from it, they inculcate numerous errors concerning them.

Most inappropriate is the account given, in the Nyáya and Vais'eshika, of the divine attributes, such as God's greatness, power, wisdom, holiness, and justice.

The soul, atoms, the mind, and many other things, no less than God, they hold to have existed from eternity. Like God, they have been, of themselves, from all duration, and were created by no one. How far does this view fall short of God's greatness, absoluteness, and sovereignty! According to the Naiyáyika, souls and atoms are innumerable; and, if they have always had spontaneous existence, it is manifest, that their existing is not in subordination to the will of God. As they had not their origin from God's will, so neither could they be by Him brought to naught. Even if God had willed otherwise, no change could have been operated as to their existence: nor will He be able to operate such change. How, then, can absoluteness and sovereignty be predicated of God, as regards them? Him we call absolute and sovereign, on whose will, or permission, everything depends; and without entire subjection to whose will, nothing can be or happen. If the existence of souls, atoms, &c. be not subject to the will of God, His sovereignty does not extend to their existence. On this principle, God cannot be proved to be God: for God is He who is over all.

To this view the pandits would bring forward this objection: "If you deny unbeginning existence to atoms, what cause of the origin of the world can you produce? For every effect must have a material cause; as a jar clay. But for the clay, of what will the potter make his jar? In this way God formed the world out of atoms; and how could He have made it without atoms?" In reply, I would ask the pandits, whether they consider the power of God to be of like kind to that of the potter. If the powers of the two be similar, then God required limbs and appliances; just as the potter, in fabricating a jar, is obliged to use his hands, feet, and sundry other implements. And, if it be conceded, that God, unlike the potter, had no need of limbs and appliances, but could have made the world by His mere will, where is the difficulty in acknowledging, that He could have created it without a material cause? By His inscrutable power He was able to originate the entire world, material cause and material effect together. If it be objected, that this is inconceivable, I would ask, whether it be not equally